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I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, a discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code relieves a
debtor of personal liability on all debts that either arose or are deemed to have
arisen prior to the date of the order for relief.' The Bankruptcy Code, however,
provides for several situations in which a debtor is not eligible for the protection
of the bankruptcy courts.2 These situations range from the debtor not being an
individual to a situation in which the debtor signs a written waiver of discharge.
If a debtor qualifies for a discharge, the code provides an additional mechanism
in Section 523 whereby individual debts may be excepted from discharge.' In
particular, Section 523(a)(3) provides for the nondischargeability of certain debts
which are not scheduled as mandated by Section 521(1).'
The Section 521(1) schedule of creditors is used to provide notice to
creditors of the order for relief and of the first meeting of creditors.5 Presum-
ably, this list would also be used to notify creditors of any additional important
events. If a particular creditor is omitted from the list, he may be precluded from,
inter alia, filing a claim, filing a request for a determination of dischargeability,
or participating in his pro-rata portion of the debtor's estate (the dividend).
Additionally, if a creditor does not have knowledge of the bankruptcy, he may
continue to expend time, money, and effort attempting to collect from the debtor
only to learn later that he was trying to squeeze blood from the proverbial turnip.
Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(3) attempts to address this situation.
Section 523(a) states, in part:
[A] discharge under section 727, 1141 ... or 1328(b) of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ....
(3) neither listed or scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with
the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, in time to permit-
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6)
of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1991).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1991) ("The Court shall grant a discharge, unless--"followed by ten
exceptions).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1991).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1991) states that the debtor shall: "(1) file a list of creditors, and unless
the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and
current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor's financial affairs ... 
5. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007.
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had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely
filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for
a determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of such
paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
case in time for such timely filing and request .... 6
Sub-paragraph (A) only excepts unscheduled debts from discharge if the
creditor was not able to file a timely proof of claim. Sub-paragraph (B) goes
further for certain other debts that are neither listed nor scheduled. Under sub-
paragraph (B), not only must a creditor have been denied the opportunity to
timely file a proof of claim, but must also have been denied the opportunity to
timely request a determination of dischargeability. The "B" debts are specified
in Section 523(a), sub-paragraphs (2), (4), and (6). These will be referred to as
"tort-type claims." Sub-paragraph (2) is for money, property, or credit obtained
under false pretenses; (4) is for fraud while acting as a fiduciary, embezzlement,
or larceny; and (6) is for willful or malicious injury by the debtor to the creditor
or his property. The distinction is made here because Section 523(a)(1), (3), (5),
(7), (8), and (9) claims have no time limit within which a creditor must bring a
request for a determination of dischargeability,7 while Section 523(a)(2), (4), and
(6) claims do.8 The time limits are provided in Section 523(c) and Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c).
-Section 523(c) separates the tort-type claims from the others. It states that
if there is no request for a determination of dischargeability, then the tort-type
claims are discharged. Rule 4007(c) additionally sets a time limit of sixty days
after the first meeting of creditors for the determination to be requested. The
policy behind Section 523(c) and Rule 4007(c) is to prevent debtors from having
to defend against charges of fraud, intentional torts, or other malfeasance many
years after the event. The other sub-sections of Section 523(a) are much less
subjective and, therefore, easier to apply. Section 523(a)(3)(B), then, simply
provides a mechanism whereby a creditor who holds a valid tort-type claim, who
is not notified of the bankruptcy in time to meet the sixty-day deadline of Rule
4007(c), can circumvent the rule and still assert a claim.
This comment will analyze the various problems that arise under Section
523(a)(3) and propose solutions to those problems. In general, the question is
how should debtors who fail to schedule a creditor be treated. Complicating the
issue, however, is the fact that the reasons for such failures range from
6. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
7. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(b) states, "A complaint other than under § 523(c) [referring to (a)
(2), (4) or (6)] may be filed at any time."
8. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) states, in part, that any complaint for determination of
dischargeability under § 523(c), which refers to § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6), "shall be filed not later than
60 days following the first date set for the meeting of creditors. .... "
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inadvertence or attorney negligence to willful or intentional failure on the part
of the debtor. Part II of this comment will outline the historical views of both
the majority and the minority positions on this issue. Part III will outline the
traditional problems that arise under both views. Finally, Part IV will attempt
to rectify the disparities between the majority and minority positions and propose
a unified approach to Section 523(a)(3). This solution would allow the minority
jurisdictions to reach less harsh and more consistent results and give the majority
jurisdictions a firmer statutory footing for the results which they are currently
reaching.
11. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF UNSCHEDULED CREDITORS
A. Majority View
The traditional treatment of unscheduled creditors has been to reopen the
case and allow the debtor to amend the schedule of creditors to include the
omitted creditor. 9 The result has been to treat the debt as if it had been listed
originally and consequently discharged. The seminal case in this line is
Robinson v. Mann.' Robinson held that in exceptional circumstances a motion
to reopen a case may be allowed in light of the equitable discretion of the
bankruptcy court."
Robinson was decided under the Bankruptcy Act Section 57(n), 2 which
barred the filing of proofs of claims any later than six months from the date the
case was filed. Robinson, however, held that Section 57(n) was not an absolute
bar to a late filing of a proof of claim or an amendment of schedules. The court
stated that an amendment of schedules beyond the statutory six-month bar was
allowable under "exceptional circumstances." 3 Factors which the Robinson
court listed in determining whether a case should or should not be reopened
included: a) the reason for the debtor's failure to list the omitted creditors; b)
the degree of disruption caused to the court and proceedings by allowing the
debtor to amend his schedules; and c) the amount of prejudice or harm to the
creditor. 4  Robinson asserted that the bar date was a prod to encourage
creditors to file their claims in a timely manner, not a stick to be used against
debtors."
9. Friendly Fin. Discount Corp. v. Jones (In re Jones), 490 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson
v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1964), reh'g denied, 341 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1965).
10. 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1964), reh'g denied, 341 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1965).
11. Id. at 550.
12. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 57(n). Any references to the Act are to the Act of 1898.
References to the Code are to the new Bankruptcy Code of 1978.
13. Robinson, 339 F.2d at 550.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit bolstered the test of Robinson, in Friendly Finance
Discount Corp. v. Jones (In re Jones).16 The court in Jones stated that in order
to deny a debtor's motion to amend the schedules to add an omitted creditor,
"the reasons ... must be real and substantial, not merely technical or conjectur-
al."' 7 The court drew a clear distinction between willful, intentional disobedi-
ence or dereliction of duty, and inadvertence and mistake due to excusable
neglect of the debtor or his counsel.' 8 The clear implication of the court's
decision in Jones was that inadvertence was not a real and substantial enough
reason to deny a discharge to an otherwise honest debtor. Jones cited Spach v.
Strauss'9 as standing for the proposition that "the right to discharge is statutory,
and the provisions of Section 14 of the Act relating to discharge should be
construed liberally in favor of the bankrupt and strictly against the objecting
creditor."2  Jones, citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,2 also asserted that the
Bankruptcy Act was intended to give a debtor "a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
pre-existing debt."2 This is commonly referred to as the "fresh start" policy.
In the Jones opinion, the court implied that equity should prevail over statutory
interpretation: "[W]e refuse to make it [the securing of discharge] a treacherous
tight-rope on which the slightest misstep spells disaster and over which only the
most accomplished acrobat can successfully pass."23
Both Robinson and Jones were decided prior to the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978. The holdings in these cases, however, serve as the
foundation for later cases in the majority of jurisdictions. The basic proposition
in the later cases is that the purpose and policy of the bankruptcy statutes are
best served by allowing the debtor who failed to list a creditor to reopen the
case, schedule the creditor, and thereby obtain a discharge. The only exceptions
to this rule have been listed in subsequent cases as willful or intentional omission
by the debtor or extreme prejudice or harm to the creditor.24
In these cases, the threshold question in determining whether or not to
reopen a case to allow amendment of the schedules has generally been whether
or not there is any evidence of fraud, intentional design, or scheme on the part
of the debtor who omitted the creditor. Once this threshold requirement has been
satisfied, the courts then focus on whether or not the creditor will be prejudiced
16. 490 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 456.
18. Id. at 456-57.
19. 373 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1967).
20. Jones, 490 F.2d at 456.
21. 292 U.S. 234, 54 S. Ct. 695 (1934).
22. Id. at 244.
23. Jones, 490 F.2d at 457.
24. Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Rosinski v. Boyd (In
re Rosinski), 759 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1985); Stark v. St. Mary's Hosp. (In re Stark), 717 F.2d 322 (7th
Cir. 1983); In re Young, 70 B.R. 968 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Gray, 57 B.R. 927 (Bankr. R.I.),
affd, 60 B.R. 428 (D.R.I. 1986).
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by allowing the debtor to reopen the case.25 The focus is on the extent of harm
to the creditor, rather than receipt of notice. 26 This author calls this the "no
harm/no foul" approach. One line of cases divides the harm test into two steps:
1) whether or not the creditor has lost his opportunity to participate in a
dividend; and 2) whether the creditor has lost his opportunity to obtain a
determination of dischargeability of the debt.27  This test stems from the
requirements of sub-paragraphs (A) and (B) of Section 523(a)(3).
Some cases add a third criterion to this two-part test.28 That is, whether
or not the creditor has been harmed by subsequent collection efforts which he
made as a result of his lack of knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy.29 In re
Mitchell 30 follows the majority of jurisdictions and states that the unintentional
omission of the creditor by the debtor is enough on its own to reopen a case
absent any real harm to the creditor." However, Mitchell adds subsequent
collection efforts as a possible source of harm. Factors this author believes
should be considered include: a) how much time has elapsed between the
collection efforts of the creditor and notice given by the debtor; and b) the
amount of time and money spent in an attempt to collect the debt. The policy
in these cases is to place the creditor in no worse a position than if he had been
scheduled and notified in the original petition. 32 For example, in In re David33
the court allowed the debtor to reopen the case and schedule the debt. However,
the court required the debtor to pay $900 in attorney's fees that the creditor had
expended attempting to collect the debt after it had been discharged. This was
the amount by which the creditor had been harmed by the lack of notice of the
debtor's bankruptcy.
The majority view, with slight permutations, has been followed in the Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.34 In summary, the goal
seems, to this author, to be to allow a debtor who inadvertently fails to list or
schedule a creditor to retain the benefit of a "fresh start" as long as there is no
prejudice to the unscheduled creditor. This approach, while seemingly fair, does
25. Id.
26. Rosiski, 759 F.2d at 541.
27. Powers v. Crum (In re Crum), 4 B.R. 486, 491 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1985); In re Zablocki, 36
B.R. 779, 783 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
28. In re Mitchell, 47 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); hi re David, 106 B.R. 126
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989); LaBate & Conti, Inc. v. Davidson (in re Davidson), 36 B.R. 538, 545
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1983).
29. Id.
30. 47 B.R. 209 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
31. Id. at 213.
32. Mitchell, 47 B.R. at 211.
33. 106 B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989).
34. In re Gray, 57 B.R. 927 (Bankr. R.I.), affd, 60 B.R. 428 (D.R.1. 1986); In re Gershenbaum,
598 F.2d 779, 783 (3d Cir. 1979); Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1964), reh'g denied,
341 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1965); Stark v. St. Mary's Hospital (in re Stark), 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.
1983); In re Dodge, 133 B.R. 654, 655 (W.D. Mo. 1991); In re Tapley, 66 B.R. 348 (Bankr. S.D.
Fl. 1986).
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have its problems. These shortcomings will be analyzed in Part III of this
comment.
B. Minority View
In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits have historically given a much
stricter interpretation of the bankruptcy statutes. The seminal decision in this
line of cases is Milando v. Perrone,35 which did not allow a debtor to reopen
a case to schedule an omitted creditor.36
In Milando, the debtor had inadvertently omitted a judgement creditor from
the original schedules. Some three years later the creditor brought suit in a
Connecticut State court to foreclose on later acquired assets. The debtor then
petitioned the bankruptcy court to reopen and amend his schedules to include the
judgment creditor and thereby preempt the state court action. The court denied
the debtor's motion and allowed the state court action to continue.37
Judge Clark reasoned, under the Bankruptcy Act, that because more than six
months had passed since the first date set for the first meeting of creditors under
Section 57, the creditor was barred at that point from filing a proof of claim.3"
As a result, an amendment of the schedule would not allow the creditor to file
a proof of claim. Judge Clark also stated that an amendment would only be
effective if he had been willing to enjoin the state court action,39 which he was
apparently not willing to do in this case. Since the debtor's purpose, to
discharge the debt, could not be effected, "reopening and amendment [were]
useless and should not be allowed." 4
Judge Clark, however, indicated that there were circumstances under which,
as a court of equity, the court could extend its rulings beyond the. boundary of
the statutes. 4' He also cited Local Loan Co. v. Hunt which stated that an
injunction would be proper "under unusual circumstances. 43 He stated that
where it was necessary to prevent fraud or injustice, a case could be reopened.4
Pepper states that the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court have been
35. 157 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946).
36. The statutes applicable in 1946 were as follows: (a) Bankruptcy Act § 57(n), which gave
creditors six months from the first date set for the first meeting of creditors to file a proof of claim;
(b) Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(8) which allowed cases to be reopened for "cause shown"; and (c)
Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(3) which stated that a debt was not discharged when a creditor was not given
time for "proof and allowance" unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceeding.
37. Milando, 157 F.2d at 1004.
38. Id. at 1003.
39. Id. at 1004.
40. Id. at 1003.
41. Id. at 1004.
42. 292 U.S. 234, 54 S. Ct. 695 (1934).
43. Id. at 241, 54 S. Ct. at 698.
44. Milando, 157 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304, 305, 60 S. Ct.
238, 244 (1939)).
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invoked such that "substance will not give way to form, [and] technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done." '45 Judge
Clark's reference to these two cases suggests that had he seen the present
situation as unjust, he would have been willing to reopen the case.
Judge Clark, however, felt constrained by the precedent of Birkett v.
Columbia Bank, 6 which held that the "notice or actual knowledge of a proceed-
ing" provision in Bankruptcy Act Section 17 required notice that was sufficient
to allow a creditor to share in any dividends of the estate and participate in the
administration of the affairs of the estate.47 Perhaps Judge Clark simply felt
that his hands were tied because the estate had already been administered. In
any event, Milando has since been interpreted as holding that once the bar date
for filing a proof of claim has passed, any omitted debts are absolutely precluded
from being discharged.48
For example, In re lannacone held that since a bar date had been scheduled
and had passed at the time of litigation, the motion to reopen would be
denied.49  The court followed the reasoning in Milando concluding that
reopening the case would not result in relief to the debtor since such an
amendment would not relate back in time prior to the bar date for filing
claims.50 A Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel case, Laczko v. Gentran,
Inc. (In re Laczko),5" also expressly adopted the reasoning of Milando. In
Laczko, the debtors amended their schedules before their case was closed.
However, the creditor did not receive notice until approximately two years after
the bankruptcy case was filed. The court held that since the creditor did not
acquire knowledge until after the bar date for filing a proof of claim, the debt
was not discharged.52 It is important to note that these cases were decided after
the promulgation of the new Bankruptcy Code. The lannacone and Laczko
decisions, however, assumed either that there had been no change in meaning or
that there was no need to distinguish the court's interpretation of Section
523(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code from its interpretation of old Bankruptcy Act
Section 17(a)(3).
While the result in a case where a bar date has passed may be a hardship to
the debtor, the minority jurisdictions have been equally harsh to creditors when
there is no bar date. In no-asset cases, the fate of unscheduled creditors lies in
the hands of the trustee. If it appears to the trustee that there are no assets from
which to pay a dividend, then the notice of the meeting of creditors may include
45. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 305, 60 S. Ct. at 244.
46. 195 U.S. 345, 350, 25 S. Ct. 38, 40 (1904).
47. Id., 25 S. Ct. at 40.
48. In re Gray, 57 B.R. 927, 929 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); Crum, 48 B.R. at 488.
49. 21 B.R. 153, 155 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
50. Id.
51. 37 B.R. 676, 679 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 912 (1985).
52. Id. at 679.
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a notice of no dividend and that there is no need to file a proof of claim.5 3 If
assets are found thereafter, then creditors will be notified and given ninety days
to file proofs of claims,54 meaning that a debtor does not really have to notify
any of his or her creditors until assets are found. This can work a very real
hardship on creditors who pursue their claims. The courts have avoided the
equitable considerations of reopening altogether in these cases, reasoning that
since there is no bar date, there can be no violation of Section 523(a)(3)(A). s5
Laczko asserted that this is an important distinction and concluded that if there
was no bar date, then Section 523(a)(3) was simply "never triggered, 56
regardless of the expense that the creditor incurred as a result of his lack of
knowledge. Because the bar date had not passed in Laczko, the creditor was
allowed to file a proof of claim and was entitled to notice in the event that assets
were found later.5 7 These cases should not be interpreted as authorizing the
reopening of a case, but rather as being consistent with other decisions that key
on whether the bar date has passed.
More recent cases have also concluded that the crucial element in allowing
a debtor to reopen a case is whether or not there was a bar date set for the filing
of proofs of claims. Bowen v. Franks (In re Bowen) held that the only exception
to the strict approach is in a case where there are no assets and the trustee has
notified. creditors that there is no need to file a proof of claim.5 8 The court
followed Laczko in saying that "under these circumstances, Section 523(a)(3)
would not have been 'triggered' because no deadline for filing proofs of claims
was ever established." 59 In In re Corgiat, the court announced the standard for
determining whether an unlisted debt is discharged or not: "The crucial
circumstance is whether or not a claims bar date has been set by the court. ' 60
Under the language of Birkett and the strictures of the Bankruptcy Act,
6 1
these decisions may have been properly decided. However, the new Code is
substantively different. In particular, the legislative history of Section 523(a)(3)
and the enactment of Section 727(b) have eroded the statutory and jurisprudential
bases for the earlier decisions.62 These issues will be explored in Part III. It
should be noted, however, that unlike the majority jurisdictions the minority
jurisdictions seem to be focusing properly on the substantive effect of scheduling
a creditor. The minority jurisdictions do not see scheduling as talismanic proof
of a discharge nor, as will be seen, should they.
53. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(e).
54. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)(5).
55. Laczko, 37 B.R. at 679; Crum, 48 B.R. at 490.
56. Laczko, 37 B.R. at 679.
57. Id. at 678.
58. 102 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989).
59. Id.
60. 123 B.R. 388, 390 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).
61. See supra note 24.
62. Legislative Statement-"Section 523(a)(3) of the House amendment is derived from the
Senate amendment. The provision is intended to overrule Birkett v. Columbia Bank ...." (1991).
[Vol. 54
COMMENTS
III. PROBLEMS AND INEQUITIES IN THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY
JURISDICTIONS
A. Majority View Problems
The major criticism of the Stark and Rosinski line of cases is that these cases
seem to assume that scheduling a debt is tantamount to its discharge. These
cases do not address the underlying question of whether a debt is discharged
once it is scheduled. Several recent cases demonstrate this line of reasoning. In
re Hocum held that
a creditor holding an otherwise dischargeable claim should not benefit
from the debtor's excusable mistake in not listing such creditor; a
debtor need not forfeit the benefits of bankruptcy where the creditor has
not been harmed .... [The Stark decision] properly focuses on the
substance of the harm that will occur rather than the form of the type
notice the creditor received.63
In re Miller contains typical language that advances this position: "When a
creditor suffers no prejudice and there is no evidence of fraud or intentional
design behind the omission, a debtor is permitted to amend his schedules."
64
This language clearly indicates that these courts believe that amending the
schedule is what could cause harm to the creditor. The underlying assumption
must be that the scheduling in and of itself affects a discharge.
This is in direct contrast, however, to 11 U.S.C. Section 727(b). Section
727(b) provides that unless specifically listed in Section 523 of the code, a
discharge under Section 727(a) discharges the debtor from all debts that arose
before the date of the order for relief.65 It seems that the proper inquiry should
be whether the debt in question is one that would be excepted from discharge
under Section 523, rather than whether or not it was listed. While these courts
may have reached desirable results, they do not assert any real statutory authority
for their position. They simply rely on "the equitable discretion of the
bankruptcy court."
Some of the later cases in the majority jurisdictions have recognized the
weakness of the majority position. They have correctly focused not on
63. 119 B.R. 723, 725 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990).
64. 125 B.R. 441 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). See Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d
1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986); Rosinski v. Boyd (In re Rosinski), 759 F.2d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 1985);
Stark v. St. Mary's Hosp. (In re Stark), 717 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1983); Soult v. Maddox (In re
Soult), 894 F.2d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 1980).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1991). In some circumstances, debts that are deemed to have arisen
pre-petition are also discharged. See 1 I U.S.C. § 502(f)-(i).
66. Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1964).
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scheduling but whether or not the debt was dischargeable under Section 523.67
Chief Judge Kressel, in In re Anderson,6 asserted that while cases decided
under Stark and Rosinski:
reach the correct result, they are inappropriately applied in the context
of the reopening of a case and are for the most part based on false
premises regarding the nature and effect of a discharge .... [C]areful
analysis reveals that the scope of a discharge is final when entered and
subsequent events do not change what debts were or were not dis-
charged .... The debt in question was either discharged or excepted
from discharge based on an analysis of § 523. Subsequent actions by
the debtor cannot affect whether or not the debt has already been
discharged. 9
Although these cases seem to be correct, the majority of courts have not adopted
this position. Some courts have acknowledged the merits of this position, but
continue to focus on reopening rather than dischargeability because they have felt
bound by the precedent of Rosinski.70
Where unnotified creditors have continued to pursue a debtor, some courts
simply allow debtors to pay creditors' collection expenses to avoid "preju-
dice."" The problem here is that these decisions are based on the Stark and
Rosinski "prejudice" standard as to whether or not the case should be reopened
rather than any provision of the Bankruptcy Code. As discussed above, this
reasoning is erroneously based upon the presumption that scheduling the debt is
equivalent to that debt's dischargeability. Under a proper analysis, the issue of
dischargeability is subject to a judicial determination under Section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code.72 Often, the majority of jurisdictions do reach equitable and
seemingly fair results. It is important, however, that these jurisdictions develop
a stronger statutory footing for their results.
B. Minority View Problems
One problem with the minority view is the inconsistency of results in no-
asset cases. Similarly situated debtors and creditors are treated differently
depending on the decision of the trustee. In a no-asset case with a bar date the
inadvertent debtor gets punished and has to pay debts that would normally be
67. See hi re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 864, 865-66 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1989); hi re Anderson, 72 B.R.
495, 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); see also In re Karamitsos, 88 B.R. 122, 122-23 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1988).
68. 72 B.R. 495.
69. Id. at 496, 497.
70. See, e.g., In re David, 106 B.R. 126, 130 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989); In re Davidson, 36
B.R. at 545.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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dischargeable. The creditor receives a windfall. This result could be a huge
price to pay for inadvertently failing to place an otherwise dischargeable'debt on
the proper list. This result defeats an honest debtor's right to receive a fresh
start.
On the other hand, in a no-asset case without a bar date the creditor may be
punished. Post-petition collection expenses would not be recoverable. In the
extreme, a no-asset debtor could intentionally fail to schedule an aggressive
creditor and through non-feasance allow the creditor to expend large sums of
money in preparation for litigation, searching for assets, or on other collection
activities. The debtor could feign inadvertence, and since there was no bar date,
Section 523(a)(3) would not be triggered. In that scenario, the creditor would
simply have to eat his losses. It does not seem congruous with the policy behind
the Code that a debtor's discharge or a creditor's recovery in a no-asset case
should turn on whether or not the trustee elected to set a bar date for the filing
of proofs of claims.
In either case, the absence of assets should be a more important factor than
the existence of a bar date. The courts should focus on a creditor's ability to get
paid instead of the trustee's procedural choice. The language of Section
726(a)(2)(C) supports this idea. This section states that a creditor can file a tardy
claim and participate in a dividend if the creditor did not have notice or actual
knowledge of the case if he files in time to permit payment of the claim. 73 In
no-asset cases it seems that the late filing would be in time to permit payment
since there is no payment unless assets are found later. The creditor's rights
would have been preserved. Inadvertence on the debtor's part should not entitle
a creditor to a windfall, especially in no-asset or small-asset cases because the
creditors have not been harmed by the omission.
Another problem with a narrow interpretation of Section 523 is that it can
lead to an absurd result when Section 523(a)(3)(B) tort-type claims are involved.
Section 523(a)(3)(A) states that any claim, other than a tort-type claim that is not
scheduled, is not discharged if the creditor is not able to "timely" file a proof of
claim. In the minority jurisdictions, a creditor must only prove that he had a
claim and that the bar date for filing a proof of claim has passed. His debt, then,
is not discharged.
In contrast, Section 523(a)(3)(B) states that tort-type claims are not
discharged if the creditor was not able to "timely" file both a proof of claim and
a request to determine the dischargeability of the debt. The court in In re
Corgiat74 held that these claims must pass a two-part test. First, the creditor
must prove that he had a claim similar to paragraph (A), as to the bar date.
Second, he must prove that the tort portion of the claim was valid; i.e., that the
creditor had actually been a victim of the type of fraud, intentional tort, or
73. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2)(C) (1991) ("proof of such claim is filed in time to permit payment
of such claim").
74. 123 B.R. 388, 391 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).
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malicious injury described in paragraphs (2), (4), and (6) of Section 523(a). The
absurd result is that tort-type claims, which for obvious policy reasons were
never intended to be dischargeable, are more difficult to except from discharge
than are ordinary claims where no intentional wrong has been done to the debtor.
For example, suppose a debtor omitted from the schedule a credit card
creditor for an amount of $10,000, and a judgment creditor for $50,000 in
damages that the debtor had caused by way of an intentional tort. In the
minority jurisdictions, the credit card debt would not be discharged simply
because the bar date for filing a proof of claim had passed regardless of whether
it was a no-asset case. On the other hand, the victim of the intentional tort
would have to prove not' only that the bar date for filing proofs of claims and
requests for determination of dischargeability had passed, but also that all of the
elements of an intentional tort had been satisfied. It is hard to imagine that
Congress intended for it to be more difficult to prove, and therefore except from
discharge, an intentional tort debt than a credit card debt. It seems that an
otherwise dischargeable debt should not be given the same deference as others
that are specifically excepted from discharge because of their nature. This
interpretation effectively writes Section 523(a)(3)(B) out of the Code, because
the existence of a passed bar date is all that is required to except the debt from
discharge.
A case directly on point is In re Corgiat.75 This was a no-asset case with
a claims bar date. The debtor failed to list a default judgment of over $63,400
which he owed to a finance company. The reason for his failure to list the
judgment was that he was not personally served with notice of the finance
company's suit against him. Apparently, the debtor had personally guaranteed
a lease and had been sued in state court as the guarantor. The creditor asserted
that its claim was based, at least in part, on alleged fraudulent acts on the part
of the debtor.
In his analysis, Judge Russell correctly stated that "[a]ll pre-petition
dischargeable debts of a Chapter 7 debtor will be discharged under the provisions
of § 727(b). 76 He failed, however, to reach the issue of whether the debtor
had perpetrated fraud upon the creditor. He held instead that "it would clearly
be inequitable to require [the creditor] to abandon the more easily established
[Section] 523(a)(3)(A) complaint in favor of a § 523(c) complaint."77 Hence,
if there is a bar date for filing proofs of claim, Section 523(a)(3)(B) is
meaningless in the Second and Ninth Circuit. The sum of $63,400 is a rather
odious penalty for a no-asset debtor to pay where the only proof of the claim is
an unanswered state court default judgment combined with a bar date for filing
proofs of claims. If all that has to be proven under sub-paragraph (A) is lack of
75. 123 B.R. 388 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).
76. Id. at 390.
77. Id. at 392.
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knowledge and a passed bar date, why would a creditor ever assert that the debt
was owed because of a tort?
Although the minority jurisdictions seem to be uncertain as to what right of
the creditor is being protected by Section 523(a)(3)(A), the legislative history
indicates that it is the right to participate in a dividend that is being protected.
As indicated earlier, the legislative history of Section 523(a)(3) states that
Section 523(a)(3) was intended to overrule Birkett v. Columbia Bank, especially
the portion of Birkett that gave a creditor the right to participate in the affairs of
the estate, not just the dividend.7' The underlying rationale for the change was
that other creditors would have enough of a similar interest to any omitted
creditors that it would be unnecessary for every individual creditor to be allowed
to participate in the administration of a particular estate. If this is indeed the
right being protected, then in the example above, to except the credit card debt
from discharge gives the creditor more rights than Congress intended, because
there was no missed dividend.
Finally, the minority jurisdictions seem to be laboring under the belief that
a discharge is to be stingily given. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 this may
have been true. A debtor under the Act had an affirmative duty to qualify each
debt from which he sought relief through a system of proof and allowance.79
The new Code, however, endeavored to reverse this process and create a
presumption of discharge. Section 727(b) has no statutory predecessor. This
provision discharges all pre-petition debts whether or not a proof of claim is filed
except as provided in Section 523.80 It would stand to reason that a narrow
construction of the exceptions to discharge is necessary to avoid frustrating the
bankruptcy statute's basic policy of giving the honest debtor a new beginning.8
IV. RESOLUTION: A SYNTHESIZED APPROACH
This section will attempt to forge a viable, unified approach which
minimizes the shortcomings and accentuates the strengths of both the majority
and minority positions. As for the minority jurisdictions, there must be an
acceptance of the presumption of discharge under Section 727(b). This is the
basis from which a more liberal interpretation of the statutes can be justified.
The majority jurisdictions must apply equity to the statutes, not simply make
decrees in the interest of policy. The unified approach will deal with three
issues: first, the method by which a case should be reopened and its substantive
effects; second, the disposition of unscheduled creditors under Section
78. 124 Cong. Rec. H11.864-866 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
79. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 57(n).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1991).
81. Caspers v. Van Home (In re Van Home), 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated
by, Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991); Farina v. Balzano (hi re Balzano), 127
B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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523(a)(3)(A); and third, the disposition of unscheduled creditors under Section
523(a)(3)(B).
As to reopening, the majority jurisdictions should adopt the minority
position. Neither reopening in and of itself nor subsequent listing of an omitted
creditor should have substantive effects. The proper procedure is for either the
creditor or debtor to file a request for a determination of dischargeability of a
debt under Rule 4007(a).82 In cases that deal with unscheduled creditors, the
real issue is whether the debt is excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(3).
Listing, vel non, is but one part of a multi-pronged test and is not in itself
dispositive of the dischargeability question.
Section 350(b) of the Code states that "[a] case may be reopened in the
court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the
debtor, or for other cause."83 It seems evident that a request for a determination
of dischargeability would qualify under the "other cause" provision of Section
350(b). The correctness of this conclusion becomes apparent when one reads
Rule 4007(b). It states that "[a] complaint other than under § 523(c) may be
filed at any time. A case may be reopened without payment of an additional
filing fee for the purpose of filing a complaint to obtain a determination under
this rule."" While Rule 4007(b) does use the permissive "may" rather than the
imperative "shall," the waiver of fees manifests an intent by Congress that these
cases should be reopened and the petitions heard.
The rules applicable to Section 350(b) additionally indicate that the
reopening of a case is not to be denied based on the amount of time that has
passed since the case was closed. Section 350(b) is implemented through Rule
5010. It allows a case to be reopened on the motion of the debtor or any other
party in interest pursuant to Section 350(b) of the code. It is important to note
that Bankruptcy Rule 9024 specifically exempts Rule 5010 and Section 350(b)
from the one year limit on the reopening of closed cases imposed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b).85 It is obvious from this rule that Congress
intended that debtors, creditors, and other parties in interest have the ability in
certain situations to reopen cases beyond the one year period.
Once a complaint has been filed and the case reopened, the remaining issue
is how to interpret Section 523(a)(3) in dealing with unscheduled creditors. The
challenge here is to interpret the statute in a way that is consistent with the
underlying policy of the Bankruptcy Code. Paragraphs (A) and (B) of Section
523(a)(3) have two common elements. These common elements are that the debt
"was neither listed or scheduled under Section 521(1) . . ." and the creditor must
82. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(a): "A debtor or any creditor may file a complaint with the court
to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of any debt."
83. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (1991).
84. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(b) (emphasis added).
85. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 states: "Rule 60 F. R. Civ. P. applies in cases under the Code
except that (1) a motion to reopen a case under the Code... is not subject to the one year limitation
prescribed in Rule 60(b) .... .."
[Vol. 54
COMMENTS
not have "had notice or actual knowledge of the case... ." Determination of
these two elements places no great burden on the judicial system. Either a debt
was listed or not, and the creditor either had notice or actual knowledge or he
did not. The more difficult issues in Section 523(a)(3) cases are whether, under
Section 523(a)(3)(A), the creditor was prevented from timely filing a proof of
claim and, under Section 523(a)(3)(B), whether the creditor was prevented from
timely filing a proof of claim and making a timely request for a determination
of dischargeability.
It has been shown above in Corgiat that a narrow interpretation of the word
"timely," to mean only that a bar date has passed, can lead to results contrary to
the policies of the Bankruptcy Code.8 6  The word "timely" in Section
523(a)(3)(A) and (B) should be interpreted in light of the right being protected.
As stated earlier, the right being protected under Section 523(a)(3)(A) is the right
to participate in a dividend. This right deserves protection when a debtor, for
any reason, prevents a creditor from exercising that right. Therefore, a creditor
should be protected to that extent. The majority jurisdictions have placed much
importance on whether an omission was willful, intentional, or inadvertent. In
fact, this issue has been crucial in deciding motions to amend the schedule.
However, if the purpose of Section 523(a)(3)(A) is to protect the creditor's right
to participate in a dividend, the debtor's state of mind should be irrelevant.
Courts should look to see if a creditor's rights have been abridged and rule on
that basis alone.
Conversely, the minority jurisdictions have paid no attention to equity and
have declared debts to be non-dischargeable even when no assets were
distributed. Under the approach suggested, equity is achieved through a more
liberal interpretation of the statute.
For example, if a $50,000 judgment creditor had not been listed, and the
final dividend was ten percent, the debtor would not be discharged to the extent
the creditor's rights had been compromised. Those rights would be worth $5,000
plus the amount the creditor expended in pursuing the debtor post-petition. If it
were a no-asset case, then the debtor would only be responsible for the creditor's
post-petition collection expenses because that would be the extent to which his
rights under Section 523(a)(3)(A) had been defeated.
It has been suggested that this type of pro-rata scheme would encourage
sloppy or slovenly accounting by debtors; that a draconian result as in Corgiat
is necessary in order to inspire debtors to be diligent in their listing of debts.
The results called for in this approach, however, should be sufficient to inspire
debtor diligence. In the example above, the $5,000 and fees would be paid out
of post-petition, after acquired assets. The debtor's pre-petition assets would
have been liquidated. A debtor should not be punished so much as to vanquish
his chance at a fresh start; but, as between two innocents, the debtor is the least
innocent and should pay for his mistakes. The proposed method achieves a
86. 123 B.R. 388, 391-92 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).
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balance between creditor protection and debtor relief and makes some sense of
a misunderstood provision. While this interpretation may seem somewhat
strained, it at least attempts to reach a policy-consistent result under color of
statute and not through "the sound discretion" standard of Robinson, Stark, and
Rosinski, which makes no reference to statutory authority.
Another reason for a bifurcated interpretation is that, of all the Section
523(a) exceptions, sub-paragraph (3)(A) claims have the least compelling basis
for non-dischargeability. The debts excepted under Section 523(a)(3)(A) are
excepted only because they may have missed a dividend. Contrarily, Section
523(a)(1), (2), (3)(B), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) are non-dischargeable
because of their nature. There are very strong policy reasons behind each of
them, which a partial listing illustrates. Section 523(a) relates to (1) taxes; (2)
obtaining credit by false pretenses; (4) fraudulent acts; (5) child support and
alimony; (6) intentional torts; (8) guaranteed student loans; and (9) death or
personal injury caused by a debtor while driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.87 Unlike Section 523(a)(3)(A) claims, these claims would not be
partially or pro-rata discharged in any event. The only exceptions to this are
claims under Section 523(a)(2), (4), or (6), which leads us to Section
523(a)(3)(B).
As stated above, there is a time limit of sixty days, from the first date set,
for the meeting of creditors to file requests for a determination of
dischargeability of Section 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) claims under Section 523(c) and
Rule 4007(c).8 8 Again, the reason for the time limit relates to problems of
defending a tort or fraud claim after much time has passed. Section 523(a)(3)(B)
allows creditors who were unlisted and without notice or actual knowledge of the
case to circumvent the time limitations of Section 523(c).
The result is that these creditors are placed on equal ground with the other
Section 523(a) claimants who have no time limit as to when a request for
determination of dischargeability may be filed. The reason is because the former
creditors do not have notice or actual knowledge of the Section 523(c) deadline.
The right being protected is the creditor's right to have an entire debt declared
non-dischargeable, regardless of the size of the debtor's estate, because of the
nature of the claim. This interpretation of the statute allows a creditor to protect
that right, and although the burden of proof is greater under sub-paragraph (B)
than (A), so too are the benefits, if successful.
In the earlier hypothetical case of two omitted debts, implementation of this
approach would give the following results. The $10,000 credit card debt would
be analyzed under Section 523(a)(3)(A) and the $50,000 intentional tort would
be analyzed under Section 523(a)(3)(B). It will be assumed that there was a
twenty percent dividend paid to unsecured creditors.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1991).
88. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c).
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The credit card company's right to participate in a dividend has been
compromised to the extent of the dividend paid, plus post-petition collection
effort monies spent. Here, the sum is twenty percent of $10,000 ($2,000)
assuming that the creditor made no post-petition collection efforts.
The tort victims' right to full compensation has been defeated by his lack of
knowledge of the bankruptcy. Therefore, if the victim/creditor can prove the
elements of the tort, the tortfeasor/debtor will still be liable to the full extent of
the $50,000 in damages that he caused. The total price to be paid by the debtor
is $52,000. This represents the $2,000 the credit card company missed in the
dividend and the $50,000 the victim would have received if he had been given
adequate notice of the proceedings.
The dilemma of what to do with an unscheduled creditor has been much
debated and much litigated. Thus, money that could have been distributed to
creditors or used to rehabilitate debtors has gone to attorneys' fees and court
costs. This is not to mention the time invested by all parties involved. Another
result has been that the majority and minority positions have moved slightly in
each other's direction. The Mendiola 9 line of cases in the majority jurisdic-
tions, which reject the motion that scheduling a debt works a discharge, is one
example. The case of Homestate Insurance Brokers of Alaska, Inc. v. Brasman
(In re Brasnan),90 in which a minority jurisdiction court rejected Laczko 9' as
binding precedent, and adopted the majority approach, is anothier example. It has
been suggested that, for policy reasons, the minority circuits should give up and
adopt the majority position.92 This does not seem likely nor is it desirable.
Procedurally and statutorily, if not equitably, the minority position is more sound
than the majority position. Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that
Congress shall have the power "[t]o establish ... uniform laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States[.]" 9 But, what is uniformity of
statute without uniformity of application? Hopefully this comment will help
promote a uniform approach to the problems it addresses.
J. Neal Prevost
89. 99 B.R. 864 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1989).
90. 119 B.R. 212 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990).
91. 37 B.R. 676 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
92. Sue Ann Slates, The Unscheduled Creditor In A Chapter 7 No-Asset Case, 64 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 281 (1990).
93. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.4.
1993]

